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1 Introduction 
It is now accepted that large scale violent internal or intra-state conflict is a major factor 
underlying developmental failure in low and middle income countries; see, for example, Collier 
et. Al (2003) and Murshed (2010). The seeds of conflict can be found in the prevalence of 
poverty, as poverty constrains livelihood choices to the point where the risks associated with 
violence become acceptable; equally internal conflict hampers economic growth and 
disadvantages development, such that poverty reduction in the presence of conflict is more 
arduous.  Thus, internal conflict is of serious concern to the development community, including 
academics, policy makers at the national as well as international level and other practitioners. 
More recently, the inequality explanations for conflict are once more rising to the fore; see, 
Østby (2013), as well as Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). The aim of this paper is to 
examine the relationship between food insecurity and conflict events short of war (mass 
demonstrations, protests and so on) in Africa, taking into account the mediating role of the 
degree of development, the extent of government expenditure, the quality of political 
institutions and governance, as well as the role of inequality in this connection.  
The principal form of war nowadays is civil war in developing countries. There were signs that 
civil war incidence (the number of civil wars and countries embroiled in them) and intensity 
(the number of fatalities) was on the wane (Gleditsch, 2008) before the beginning of this 
decade, but other forms of violence associated with mass protest and state suppression of these 
were also a matter of growing concern. With regard to the relationship between food insecurity 
and conflict, it is important to differentiate the type of conflict between wars (civil war and 
insurgency), and other conflict events short of war (mass demonstrations, protests and so on). 
We focus on the latter type of violence, focussing on these events in Africa.  
Since time immemorial food shortages and food price increases have sparked social unrest. It 
needs to be borne in mind that the association between food insecurity1 or food price volatility 
and social unrest is indirect, including the mediating effect of a variety of other factors. It is 
indirect because a heightened sense of food insecurity brought about by rising or volatile food 
prices feeds into other fundamental causes of conflict, usually pre-existing grievances and state 
failure. Rising food prices lower the real income of food consumers, who for a given income 
are less able to purchase a fixed food basket without jeopardising their consumption of other 
goods and services, and the demand for basic foodstuffs is notoriously inelastic. Those affected 
are consumers (not net producers) of food, particularly low income households, but also 
middle-class consumers in developed countries who witness an erosion of their living 
standards. Clearly, poorer nations are more at the risk of conflict, following food price 
increases. Rising food prices are unlikely to be the sole cause of conflict, notwithstanding the 
examples of the Arab Spring in 2011, the revolutions in Europe in 1848, and famously the 
French revolution of 1789 which followed a bad harvest. History is replete with instances of 
food price increases following poor harvests that do not lead to major riots or revolutions, 
usually because of countervailing action mitigating the effects of food price increases by the 
state. Thus, for food price spikes to cause conflict they have to fuel existing grievances against 
the state or other groups, as well as the inability of the state to manage, suppress or placate 
 
1 Food insecurity can have several meanings. It can refer to the fragility of the supply of food, the diminution of 
food stocks, as well as the inability of consumers to obtain food or adequate nutrition due to famine, poverty, or 
the lack of entitlement to social protection. Food insecurity emanates from the volatility of food stocks as well as 
price shocks, which in a globalised world is only partially related to domestic factors, but also international prices. 
In developed countries, food insecurity mainly emanates from disruptions in the supply chain, the shortage of 
domestic production due to the volatility in farmer’s incomes, resulting in the encouragement of domestic 
production through agriculture subsidies, as in the European Union.    
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these grievances. Also, food prices have become increasingly globalised, and the transmission 
of international shock to domestic prices is more rapid in recent years. 
The adverse effects of rising food insecurity are likely to be more acute in poorer countries 
with a poor record of economic growth and where poverty is widespread. Furthermore, food 
insecurity is more likely to lead to conflict, whether in the form of protest or war, in more 
unequal societies and where mitigating policies are not pursued by the state. Thus, the political 
system is important, as is the fiscal capacity of the state to undertake mitigating policies and 
good governance. Food insecurity ultimately can act as a tipping point that turns relative 
deprivation, grievances, as well as inter-group and inter-household inequality into conflict in 
the form of protest and/or war in the presence of weak state capacity. The current, cross-country 
empirical literature does not incorporate all these mediating factors into their empirical 
strategy, as can be observed from our brief literature review in section 2.  This is followed by 
a discussion of our empirical strategy for linking food insecurity and conflict in section 3. Our 
empirical findings are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.            
2 Review of the Cross-Country Empirical Literature  
One of the earliest papers on this theme is by Miguel, Satynath and Sergenti (2004) who looked 
at the impact of economic growth on the risk of civil war. By treating economic growth as 
endogenous to conflict (as there is a reverse causality problem), and by using the rainfall rate 
as the instrument for growth in 41 African countries during 1980-99, Miguel, Satyanath and 
Sergenti (2004) find that growth is negatively and strongly related to civil war. A negative 
growth shock of five percentage points increases the likelihood of civil war by one-half in the 
following year. Food insecurity, on impact, is likely to have a negative impact on national 
income in poorer, low-income, developing countries.   
Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) in a work for the World Food Programme (WFP) provide a 
general thematic overview of the link between food insecurity and violent conflict in its various 
forms including wars and demonstrations. They look at case studies of various developing 
countries, and explicit policy responses in ‘fragile’ states to rising food prices during the recent 
spike in 2007-08.   
In a paper on food prices and political instability, Arezki and Brückner (2011) look at the effect 
of food prices on political instability in a cross-section of 120 countries in the 1970-2007 
period. For prices they construct a country specific index of international food prices with a 
time invariant average value of net exports (net exports over GDP) of a food commodity for 
the entire sample period. When the international price of a food commodity rises, it has a 
negative wealth effect on the country’s national income if the country is a net importer, and 
vice versa if it is a net exporter. They look at the effect of variations in international food prices 
on democracy/autocracy scores using the polity data, the incidence of civil war from the PRIO-
Uppsala (UCDP) data set, and the Arthur Banks2 data on the number of riots and 
demonstrations. They find that food price increases lower democracy scores and increase the 
number of riots and demonstrations, as well as civil wars in low-income countries but not in 
rich countries. Furthermore, in the post cold war era the effects of food price increases are 
heightened for demonstrations and some other forms of conflict.  
Bellemare (2014) analyses the effect of food price insecurity on conflict for the 1990-2011 
period. The period of analysis is monthly rather than the standard annual analysis. He used the 
 
2 http://www.cntsdata.com/ 
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Food and Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) data on the index of international prices, as well 
as other food price indices, such as those for cereals, which weigh more heavily on the typical 
food basket in poor countries. His measure of food insecurity was both food price levels, and 
its volatility measured by a coefficient of variation for the proximate three months. The conflict 
variable is incidents for the month based on a LexisNexis search of English language sources 
of reports on incidents such as food riots. He followed an instrumental variable approach due 
to potential endogeneity of food prices and conflict, using natural disasters as an instrument, 
similar to the rainfall instrument employed by Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004). He finds 
that food price increases do cause more conflict, but not food price volatility.      
Hendrix and Haggard (2015) in their study between 1961 and 2010 use a number of control 
variables covering unrest in Asian and African countries where they argue that 92% of the 
world’s food insecurity lies. They utilise a food price index from UNCTAD, as well as polity 
scores, data on urban bias in agricultural policies, the degree of international trade openness, 
growth in national income (GDP) and levels of national income. Their dependent variable is 
urban unrest in Africa and Asia drawn from the PRIO Urban Social Disturbance database. This 
variable includes all forms of unrest, not just violent cases. The results are contingent on regime 
type with democracies and anocracies (polities with characteristics of both democracies and 
autocracies) more prone to unrest after food price rises, and rural bias also contributes to more 
urban unrest after a food crisis. 
Smith (2014) in his analysis of urban unrest for African countries in the 1990-2012 period 
utilises domestic food prices obtained from the ILO, an instrumental variable approach using 
global grain prices and local rainfall as instruments. The controls are regime type, the share of 
urban population, share of youth in the population, GDP per capita, life expectancy and infant 
mortality. Changes in domestic food prices do contribute to urban unrest. 
Weinberg and Bakker (2015) also utilise a measure of domestic food prices in their analysis 
covering 71 countries from 1972 to 2007. They convert global prices into a domestic price 
proxy using a consumer tax equivalent (CTE) based on data from the World Bank. Their 
measure of conflict is drawn from the Banks data set on riots, demonstrations and government 
crises. They control for regime type, urban population, ethnic fractionalisation and economic 
growth. Using count data methods changes in food prices do raise the risk of the conflict types 
described. Thus governments that prevent food price increases (the transmission of external 
price shocks) largely avoid food price based unrest, thus underlying the importance of 
countervailing policies when food crises occur. 
Raleigh, Choi and Kniveton (2015) in their disaggregated study look at 113 African markets in 
24 countries from 1997 to 2010. Their work also looks at climatic factors such as dryness and 
rainfall. Their conflict data is drawn from a PRIO data base (ACLED), which includes the 
locality of the conflict. The novelty of their approach is the simultaneous determination of local 
food commodity prices and conflict. Interventions in local markets can mitigate the effects of 
both conflict and climate factors on food prices. Natalini, Jones and Bravo (2015) look at which 
political or governance measure best captures the propensity for food price riots, finding that 
the World Bank’s Political Instability and Absence of Violence is the best indicator. Within 
the transmission mechanism, the political stability of the state is important in turning food price 
increases to riots. They also identify food price thresholds, above which riots are more likely.    
3 Empirical Methodology 
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Our empirical strategy investigates the effect of food insecurity (both level and volatility of 
food prices) on conflict events, while exploring the impact of different measures of institutional 
quality and inequality as explanatory variables with different specifications within this nexus. 
Our dependent variable on social unrest utilises data on conflict events is obtained from the 
PRIO-ACLED (armed conflict location and event data project) data set which records protests 
and political violence for Africa at a sub-national level. This data, as well as our other data, are 
annualised at the country-year level.  In this way, and particularly because our data is on 
political events and not war, we avoid endogeneity issues between political events and food 
price volatility. The annex to the paper gives the country coverage and descriptive statistics on 
all the variables employed in our study.   
The main independent variable of interest relates to food price insecurity. Here both food price 
levels and volatility in food prices need to be examined, but mainly the latter. Food price data 
(in the form of consumer price index, CPI, with base year of 2010) is taken from FAO 
database3. Food price index (food CPI) includes a complete and consistent set of time series 
from 2000 to 2015, compiled by FAO using population weights to aggregate across countries. 
The original data is on monthly basis and we transformed this data into annualised information 
by simple averaging in any given year. These indices measure the price change between the 
current and reference periods of the average basket of goods and services purchased by 
households. Based on this price index, price volatility index is calculated following the 
methodology in Haldenwang and Ivanyna (2017). The volatility index can be understood as 
the typical deviation of the variable from a quadratic time trend over the period. In other words, 
it measures average volatility for this period (2000-2015).    
We add other control variables, as well as mediating variables, which will be an innovation of 
the project. It needs to be borne in mind that some of the earliest studies hardly control for other 
factors; Arezki and Brückner (2011), for example. As primary control variables, we employ 
GDP per capita growth, as food price insecurity and the governmental responses to these 
depend on the changes in the income level of the country, and growth contributes to this 
capacity. We also use the share of youth and urban population, as a more urban or more 
youthful population can also contribute to conflict following food price increases via the 
relative deprivation mechanism.  
Whether food price volatility produces conflict, also depends on the nature of the nation’s 
polity: so we will use the POLITY combined autocracy and democracy scores. Autocracies are 
more adept at suppressing dissent, democracies may adopt mitigating policies. We also include 
the squared value of POLITY to check for any non-linear factors in this process. In addition to 
POLITY, we use the varieties of democracy (V-Dem) data set; see Coppedge et al (2016). In 
particular, we use the participatory index (where a rise in value indicates improvement) 
incorporating not just electoral government, but facets of direct democracy such as civil society 
engagement and sub-national government powers. Hence the V-Dem measure constitutes a 
broader, more encompassing, measure of democratic quality.  
Unlike the rest of the literature we also employ quality of governance variables from the World 
Bank (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010), specifically factors such as the control of 
corruption, government effectiveness and the rule of law4. On the one hand, governance may 
matter more than regime type in managing food insecurity, bearing in mind that good 
 
3 Data on food CPI is available at: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CP (accessed on 27 January 2017). 
4 These scores run from -2.5 (lowest or worst) to 2.5 (highest or best). One reason for using this data rather than 
sources such as ICRG, is the wide country coverage of this dataset after 1997.  
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governance, and its converse, is possible in both democracies and autocracies. But on the other 
hand, the type of polity is very germane to the right to protest. 
Since the mechanism via which rising or volatile food prices is most likely to engender conflict 
(war or protest) lie in a relative deprivation or horizontal inequality effect, it is important to 
explicitly incorporate inequality measures into the econometric model. This has not been done 
in any of the studies reviewed above, and will be an innovation of our study. We propose two 
alternative measures related to vertical and horizontal inequality. The former is particularly 
pertinent in the case of conflict in the form of demonstrations and riots, short of full blown civil 
war. Here we could have used the All the Ginis (version 2016) database created by Branko 
Milanovic.5 We also use the egalitarian component index from the V-Dem data base. This has 
a political component measuring equal access to freedoms and rights, as well as the egalitarian 
distribution of economic resources across social groups, including the fulfilment of basic needs 
across society. Our working hypothesis is that greater inequality fuels conflict. 
As far as horizontal inequality is concerned, we can employ the ethnic power relations (EPR) 
dataset developed by Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). In particular we use the 
percentage of the politically excluded population, the share of the excluded group size relative 
to the powerful ethno-political group. We also utilise the percentage of the discriminated 
population who are powerless or totally discriminated against. Data on the economic aspects 
of horizontal inequality (such as income) on a systematic basis across countries is still not 
available to facilitate a proper panel data econometric analysis.          
A further innovation of our study is to include, independent variables on state capacity such as 
government expenditure.6 These are proxies for countervailing and mitigating actions by the 
state after food price increases. Our identification strategy involves the incorporation of 
measures of polity, governance, inequality and state capacity, as they are the mechanisms via 
which rising food prices can lead to conflict, as well as the avenues via which discontent at 
food price increases may be managed. In some instances, it may be worthwhile interacting 
some of these variables with food price increase measures to examine the strength of 
mechanisms in the middle of the process of how food price increases leads to more conflict.  
To summarise, we carry out static panel data analysis, and the period of analysis is from 2000 
to 2015 covering 40 countries in Africa using ordinary least squares. We carry out pooled (cross 
section and time series) estimates as well as fixed and random effects panel estimates along 
with Hausman tests in each individual estimate. The model is specified as: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶it =  𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 + β1𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼it +  β2𝑋𝑋it + γt + vi + ϵit … … … (1) 
We utilise both a food price index and food price volatility separately as a measure of food 
insecurity in the model. X represents a set of control variables as discussed, vi are country fixed 
effects that captures time-invariant country specific unobservable characteristics and γt are 
year fixed effects to capture any variation in conflict between years which might not be covered 
by the explanatory variables in the model. The idiosyncratic error term is indicated by ϵit.  
 
5 See, https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Centers-and-
Institutes/Stone-Center-on-Socio-Economic-Inequality/Core-Faculty,-Team,-and-Affiliated-LIS-
Scholars/Branko-Milanovic/Datasets, accessed 04 April 2017.  
6 Annualised data on social protection and food subsidies for a cross section of developing countries over a 
sufficiently long time period to enable a panel data set to be constructed was not obtainable.   
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4 Empirical Findings 
In table 1, our base line regressions, both food prices and its volatility tend to be significant 
except for the fixed effects estimators. Growth in per-capita GDP significantly reduces conflict 
risk, as our sample is mainly composed of low-income African economies; as countries become 
richer they face less food price related conflict risk. Also, government spending tends to 
significantly lower the incidence of protest, although the signs of the share of urban and youth 
population are counter-intuitively negative, but mostly insignificant.  
 
Table 1: Conflict Events (ACLED-UCDP) and Food Prices 
 Conflict Events (ACLED UCDP) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled Pooled FE FE RE RE 
       
Food Price 1.027***  0.423  1.443***  
 (0.334)  (0.664)  (0.321)  
Food Price Volatility  190.346***  145.942  222.848*** 
  (56.692)  (109.654)  (62.428) 
Government 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 
-1.907* -1.977* -4.299*** -4.119** -2.386* -1.258 
 (1.017) (1.017) (1.632) (1.628) (1.331) (1.298) 
GDP per capita growth -4.615*** -4.397*** -6.262*** -6.057*** -5.679*** -5.127*** 
 (1.397) (1.396) (1.341) (1.339) (1.300) (1.312) 
Urban population (% of 
total) 
-2.654*** -2.327*** -1.688 -1.195 -2.083* -1.617 
 (0.610) (0.609) (6.448) (6.450) (1.190) (1.180) 
Youth population (% of 
total) 
-10.196*** -10.643*** 0.441 0.716 -7.433** -10.647*** 
 (2.086) (2.086) (8.370) (8.357) (3.692) (3.690) 
Constant 586.472*** 652.320*** 197.379 146.441 432.990** 601.547*** 
 (121.706) (119.365) (392.773) (394.519) (203.309) (200.928) 
       
Observations 499 499 499 499 499 499 
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effect specifications (column 3 and 4) included period fixed effect which are not 
presented in the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hausman tests suggests random effect static panel estimator would 
be a superior estimator of our model.  
In table 2, we introduce polity and institutional variables in the regressions with conflict 
events.7 These additional variables relate to the quality of democracy drawn from polity, as 
well as another quality of democracy measure, the participatory index, drawn from V-Dem, 
also governance variables: corruption, government effectiveness and the rule of law. Data on 
the latter three variables are drawn from the well-known World Bank-Kaufmann et Al (2010) 
data set. All the governance variables are significant and have the right sign (except polity 
variable, although the squared term remains significant). This indicates a non-linear 
relationship with conflict. Although greater democracy promotes more civil war risk, this starts 
to decline after a certain level of democracy is reached, as found by Hegre et. Al (2001). Also, 
food price volatility continues to significantly enhance the risk of political protest events. In 
African nations, governance may matter more, and greater political participation can promote 
 
7 In tables 2 to 4 we only report random effects estimators, which is found to be a superior estimator by the 
Hausman test.  
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protest.  Interestingly, the effect of government expenditure loses significance in explaining 
unrest, implying that governance matters more. 
Table 2: Conflict Events - Food Price Volatility in the Presence of Institutions 
Random Effects Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Food Price Volatility 222.848*** 217.604*** 235.175*** 216.818*** 233.732*** 249.894*** 
 (62.428) (66.503) (67.063) (66.564) (62.538) (65.854) 
Control of 
Corruption 
 -85.008*** 
(26.749) 
    
       
Government 
Effectiveness 
  -94.740*** 
(29.481) 
   
       
Rule of Law    -112.643***   
    (28.711)   
Participatory 
component index 
    291.388** 
(113.503) 
 
       
Polity2      4.503 
      (3.032) 
(Polity2)2      -1.289** 
      (0.626) 
Government 
Expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
-1.258 -0.579 -0.785 -0.239 -1.415 -1.096 
 (1.298) (1.350) (1.366) (1.361) (1.301) (1.370) 
GDP per Capita 
Growth 
-5.127*** -5.781*** -5.429*** -5.568*** -4.808*** -4.667*** 
 (1.312) (1.470) (1.478) (1.462) (1.310) (1.346) 
Urban Population (% 
of total) 
-1.617 -2.010* -2.048* -1.947 -1.746 -1.722 
 (1.180) (1.156) (1.223) (1.195) (1.204) (1.223) 
Youth Population (% 
of total) 
-10.647*** -13.134*** -14.358*** -13.647*** -12.289*** -12.021*** 
 (3.690) (3.726) (3.980) (3.819) (3.796) (3.865) 
Constant 601.547*** 654.847*** 696.947*** 642.751*** 558.835*** 684.004*** 
 (200.928) (200.332) (210.465) (204.857) (204.138) (210.690) 
       
Observations 499 463 463 463 499 485 
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 40 39 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
In table 3, we attempt to interact food price volatility with our institutional variables. Our aim 
is to gauge what mediating effect institutional quality in the form of either the quality of 
democracy or the effectiveness of governance has on the conflict enhancing aspects of food 
price volatility. Although all interactions have the correct signs, the interaction effect with the 
broader participatory definition of democracy drawn from the V-DEM data set is the only 
significant effect.  
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Table 3: Conflict Events - Food Price Volatility and Interaction with Institutions  
Random Effects Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Food Price Volatility 217.487** 227.638** 278.750*** 618.394*** 248.631*** 
 (109.911) (113.781) (107.255) (203.129) (65.759) 
Control of Corruption -84.978***     
 (31.856)     
Food Volatility*control of 
corruption 
-0.640 
(105.053) 
    
Government Effectiveness  -94.623***    
  (34.171)    
Food Volatility * Govt. 
Effectiveness 
 -9.551 
(108.190) 
   
      
Rule of Law   -126.772***   
   (33.989)   
Food Volatility * Rule of law   71.234   
   (97.207)   
Participatory Component 
Index 
   423.534*** 
(130.637) 
 
Food Volatility * Participatory 
Index    
-985.540** 
(496.642)  
Polity2     5.910* 
     (3.462) 
Food Volatility * Polity2     -10.748 
     (12.790) 
(Polity2)2     -1.282** 
     (0.624) 
Government Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
-0.564 
(1.378) 
-0.782 
(1.382) 
-0.034 
(1.388) 
-1.701 
(1.310) 
-1.256 
(1.380) 
GDP per Capita Growth -5.787*** -5.434*** -5.502*** -4.873*** -4.722*** 
 (1.472) (1.481) (1.465) (1.306) (1.348) 
Urban Population (% of total) -1.990* -2.030 -1.903 -1.873 -1.753 
 (1.171) (1.238) (1.209) (1.222) (1.214) 
Youth Population (% of total) -13.129*** -14.401*** -13.558*** -13.410*** -12.281*** 
 (3.766) (4.019) (3.858) (3.869) (3.857) 
Constant 653.409*** 698.102*** 620.910*** 567.388*** 700.078*** 
 (203.669) (213.523) (208.669) (206.048) (210.441) 
      
Observations 463 463 463 499 485 
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 39 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
In table 4, we examine the impact of inequality. In order to isolate its effect from institutional 
factors that may mitigate or exacerbate its impact on conflict we drop the institutional variables 
in this analysis. We wish to incorporate income inequality in the form of GINI coefficients (the 
greater the coefficient the higher the degree of inequality). So given our postulate that 
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inequality enhances conflict, we would expect that sign to be positive. We also utilise the more 
hybrid egalitarian component index which measures the equality of rights across social groups 
as well as the provision and coverage of basic needs. The higher the index the more egalitarian 
is the society in question, hence our expectation for the sign of this coefficient is negative. 
These two measures (the GINI and egalitarian index) are our measures of vertical inequality, 
the first being intra-household the latter being socio-economic group based. Then we have the 
measures of inter-ethnic group horizontal inequality from the EPR data set. We would expect 
their signs to be positive because, as constructed, a higher value implies greater inter-group 
inequality. 
Egalitarianism has the expected negative effect on political unrest events although the 
coefficient is insignificant. The other horizontal inequality measures have the correct sign and 
are significant with the exception of the percentage of the discriminated. The coefficient on 
GINI appears with a counter-intuitive sign, but is statistically insignificant. This may be 
because greater income equality, particularly a higher middle class income share may spark 
more protest. Also, control variables such as per capita income growth are significant. 
Table 4: Conflict Events - Food Price Volatility in the Presence of Inequality 
Random Effects Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Food Price Volatility 222.848*** 215.430*** 291.346*** 45.056 71.326** 58.468* 
 (62.428) (62.495) (109.420) (32.806) (34.237) (32.401) 
Egalitarian Component Index   -82.881 (91.839)     
Gini Index    -0.822 (2.030) 
   
Share of excluded population 
to ethno-politically relevant 
population (Log) 
   26.225*** 
(4.864) 
  
 
Discriminated Population (in 
%) 
    14.617 
(65.012) 
 
       
Powerless Population  
(in %) 
     217.842*** 
(35.359) 
       
Government Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
-1.258 -1.251 -1.432 -1.042 -1.729** -0.946 
 (1.298) (1.291) (2.434) (0.802) (0.811) (0.797) 
GDP per Capita Growth -5.127*** -5.178*** -2.219 -2.242** -2.389** -2.491*** 
 (1.312) (1.315) (2.881) (0.885) (0.929) (0.872) 
Urban Population (% of total) -1.617 -1.613 -2.216 0.184 -0.874 -0.150 
 (1.180) (1.153) (1.549) (0.983) (0.907) (0.998) 
Youth Population (% of total) -10.647*** -10.555*** -13.597*** -0.422 -2.058 -0.606 
 (3.690) (3.619) (4.463) (2.733) (2.621) (2.763) 
Constant 601.547*** 643.544*** 758.868*** 59.644 224.579 98.934 
 (200.928) (202.215) (270.029) (149.513) (142.225) (149.806) 
       
Observations 499 499 169 393 393 393 
Number of countries 40 40 33 38 38 38 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS  
Since time immemorial food shortages and food price increases have sparked social unrest. 
Indeed, the colloquial Egyptian Arabic word for bread, ayesh, also means life. Food price 
increases do not necessarily spark widespread protest or civil war or revolution. The degree of 
any resultant conflict, depend on a host of factors including the degree of inter-personal and 
inter-group inequality, the income level of the country, its relative urban and youth population 
share, its polity, quality of governance, the degree of social protection or government 
expenditure and state capacity. Not all studies in the realm of the cross-country empirical 
analysis of food insecurity and conflict incorporate all of these factors. Our innovation lies 
therein. 
The consequences of internal conflict are not confined to the territories of countries in which 
it takes place, but as major international spill-overs to other countries. Chief among these are 
humanitarian crises involving refugees and assistance to those affected by conflict, but also 
complex humanitarian crises such as famine can be a consequence of civil war. It may also 
effect the ability of food importers to source foodstuff from conflict affected exporters, as 
conflict can disrupt supply chains, as well as food production. Consequently internal conflict 
on a large scale should be viewed as a global problem, and its mitigation, management and 
prevention should be seen to be a global public good. 
Our results suggest that food prices, and especially food price volatility, do contribute 
statistically significantly to social and political unrest risk measured by political events in 
Africa (ACLED) data. The growth in per-capita income is significant and has the right negative 
sign, indicating that richer countries face less food price related political unrest. Government 
expenditure as a share of national income has the correct negative sign, but becomes 
insignificant once we introduce institutional quality and inequality. It suggests that in African 
nations governance may matter more, and greater political participation can promote protest.  
Other control variables such as the youth and urban share occasionally have unexpected signs 
in our regressions, but these are mostly insignificant. 
We have underscored the mediating role of ‘institutions’ in the food price (volatility)-conflict 
nexus. The institutional variables that we employ can be divided in to two categories. First, we 
utilised political institutions, which are a measure of process. We chose to measure these using 
the well-known POLITY measure of the degree of autocracy-democracy, and the much broader 
participatory index drawn from the newly launched V-DEM data set. The latter measure 
contains many more facets related to the degree of citizens and social group participation in 
political processes, and also does not suffer from the limitation of the POLITY data set which 
is endogenous to conflict, as the democracy and autocracy score of a country in any year is 
affected by the emergence of conflict. Be that as it may, our results indicate that greater 
democracy can engender more conflict, especially when it comes to protests, riots or other 
disturbances, but after a certain threshold of higher democratic development greater democracy 
is conflict abating. The V-DEM participatory index can also encourage more protest, but it 
does not enhance civil war related fatalities.  
The second set of our institutional variables pertain to outcomes related to the quality of 
governance: the rule of law, the control of corruption and the effectiveness of government 
administration. They emerge with the right negative signs implying lesser conflict in the 
presence of good governance. The importance of governance in this regard is highlighted by 
the fact that when we interact food price volatility or level with governance, the food price 
volatility or food price level coefficient sometimes becomes statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, the degree of government expenditure as a proportion of national income loses 
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its salience, becoming statistically insignificant. This emphasizes the salience of the mediating 
role of institutions and state capacity when it comes to unrest induced by food price volatility. 
An innovation of our study is the inclusion of inequality. We deploy two metrics of inter-
personal or inter-household vertical inequality: the GINI coefficient of income inequality and 
the V-DEM egalitarian index, which is a broader measure of how egalitarian a society is. The 
V-DEM egalitarian index emerges with the correct expected signs, suggesting that more 
inequality breeds more conflict. The GINI index of income inequality, however, has a counter-
intuitive statistically insignificant sign, implying that greater income equality may result in a 
greater risk of political unrest surrounding food price volatility. This may be very well the case, 
as greater equality implies a higher middle class share of income, and it is precisely these 
groups who are politically more vocal. We also utilize measures of inter-group or horizontal 
inequality in its political dimensions. These result in expected signs; more horizontal inequality 
leads to greater conflict and is quite often statistically significant.  
 
REFERENCES 
Arezki, Rabah and Markus Brückner (2011) ‘Food Prices and Political Instability’, CESifo 
 Working Paper no. 3544.  
Bellemare, Marc (2014) ‘Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility and Social Unrest’, 
 American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 97(1): 1-21.  
Brinkman, Henk-Jan and Cullen Hendrix (2011) Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: 
 Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges, World Food Programme, 
 Occasional Paper no 24.  
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian-Skrede Gleditsch and Halvard Buhaug (2013) Inequality, 
 Grievances, and Civil War, New York: Cambridge University Press.   
Collier, Paul, Lani Elliot, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas 
Sambanis (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World 
Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, 
 David Altman, Frida Andersson, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, 
 Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya 
 Mechkova, Farhad Miri, Pamela Paxton, Josefine Pernes, Daniel Pemstein, Jeffrey 
 Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Brigitte Zimmerman. 
 2016. “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v6.” Varieties of Democracy 
 (V-Dem) Project. 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2008) ‘The Liberal Moment Fifteen Years On’, International Studies 
 Quarterly, 15 (4): 691-712.  
von Haldenwang Christian and Maksym Ivanyna (2017) Does the political resource curse 
affect public finance? The vulnerability of tax revenue in resource-rich countries. 
WIDER Working Paper, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland. Available at: 
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2017-7.pdf [accessed 31 January, 2017] 
Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001) ‘Towards a 
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Civil Change, and Civil War 1816-1992’, 
American Political Science Review, 95(1): 17-33. 
13 
 
Hendrix, Cullen and Stephan Haggard (2015) ‘Global Food Prices, Regime Type, and Urban 
 Unrest in the Developing World’, Journal of Peace Research, 52 (2): 143-157  
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010) The Worldwide Governance 
 Indicators Methodology and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research Working 
 Paper No. 5430 (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130 accessed on 29 June 2017 
Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satynath and Ernest Sergenti (2004) ‘Economic Shocks and Civil 
 Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach’, Journal of Political Economy, 
 112(4): 725-753.  
Murshed, S Mansoob (2010) Explaining Civil War: A Rational Choice Approach, 
 Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Natalini, Davide, Aled Jones and Giangiacomo Bravo (2015) ‘Quantitative Assesment of 
 Political Fragility Indices and Food Prices as Indicators of Food Riots in Countries’, 
 Sustainablity, 7, 4360-4385, open access.  
Østby, Gudrun (2013) ‘Inequality and Political Violence: A Review of the Literature’, 
 International Areas Studies Review, 16(2): 206-231. 
Raleigh, Clionadh, Hyun Jin Choi and Dominic Kniveton (2015) ‘The Devil is in the Details: 
 An Investigation of the Relationships between Conflict, Food Price and Climate 
 Across Africa, Global Environmental Change  
Smith, Todd (2014) ‘Feeding Unrest: Disentangling the Causal Relationship between Food 
 Price Shocks and Sociopolitical Conflict in Urban Africa’, Journal of Peace 
 Research, 51 (6): 679-695. 
Weinberg, Joe and Ryan Bakker (2014) ‘Let Them Eat Cake: Food Prices, Domestic Policy 
and Social Unrest, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32(3): 309-326.  
  
14 
 
Annex: Descriptive Statistics, 2000-2015 and Country List 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Observations 
Conflict Variables    
Number of Conflict Events in a year (ACLED UCDP) 111.94 260.21 640 
Food Price    
International Food Price Index  89.62 31.37 633 
International Food Price Volatility Index 0.15 0.15 633 
Institutions    
Control of Corruption -0.60 0.53 557 
Government Effectiveness -0.67 0.53 557 
Rule of Law -0.63 0.52 557 
Polity2 1.12 5.12 582 
Participatory Component Index 0.41 0.13 640 
Macroeconomic Variables    
Government Expenditure (% of GDP) 26.99 9.31 513 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.40 7.26 584 
Inequality variables    
Egalitarian Component Index 0.54 0.17 640 
Gini Index 43.64 8.66 195 
Share of Excluded Population relative to  
ethno-politically relevant Population (Log) 
1.62 1.72 418 
Discriminated Population (in %) 0.02 0.08 418 
Powerless Population (in %) 0.10 0.21 418 
Others    
Urban Population (% of total) 39.81 18.35 597 
Youth Population (% of total) 41.45 6.03 597 
List of Countries 
Algeria Libya 
Angola Madagascar 
Benin Malawi 
Botswana Mali 
Burkina Faso Mauritania 
Burundi Morocco 
Cameroon Mozambique 
Central African Republic Namibia 
Chad Niger 
Djibouti Nigeria 
Egypt Rwanda 
Equatorial Guinea Senegal 
Ethiopia South Africa 
Gabon Sudan 
Gambia Swaziland 
Ghana Tanzania 
Guinea-Bissau Togo 
Kenya Tunisia 
Lesotho Uganda 
Liberia Zambia 
 
